

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

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FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

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(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

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Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003

MEETING

19 SEPTEMBER 2018

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Blue Boxes = SCO Redactions

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CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED] /NSICG
REASON: 1.4(C)
DERIVED FROM: FBI NSICG, DATED 07-11-2022
DECLASSIFY ON: 20971231

b6-1, per FBI
b7C-1, per FBI

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

B. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]

b1-1, per FBI
b3-1, per FBI
b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign. [REDACTED]

b1-1, per FBI
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~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

b1-1, per FBI
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~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
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Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, [REDACTED]

b1-1, per FBI
b3-1, per FBI
b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4,-13, per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. ~~(S)~~ Carter Page.

A. ~~(S)~~ Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

~~(S//NF)~~ Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

b7E-3,-4, per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C-6, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

B. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~~(S//NF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁰ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

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⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4,-14, per FBI

¹⁰ ~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 [REDACTED] and was opened as an FBI source [REDACTED] Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI. As discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

b1-1, per FBI
b3-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4,-12, per FBI

FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

~~(TS//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. [REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
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~~(TS//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. [REDACTED]

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~~(TS//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹² [REDACTED] reported

[REDACTED]

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~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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b7E-3,-4, per FBI

~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

¹¹ ~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b1-1, per FBI
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b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

¹² ~~(S//NF)~~ In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~


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~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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
~~(TS//NF)~~ [redacted] according to Source #1, [redacted]




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[redacted] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin]



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b7E-3,4, per FBI



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or

"kompromat"¹⁵ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹⁶ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

¹⁵ ~~(S)~~ Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

¹⁶ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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¹⁷ ~~(TS//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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¹⁸ ~~(TS//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁹ ~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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²⁰ ~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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b7E-3,-4, per FBI

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

b6-4, per FBI
b7C-4, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3, -4, per FBI

~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3, -4, per FBI

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3, -4, per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(TS//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b7E-3, -4, per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page. [REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(TS//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1, per FBI
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~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²¹ ~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C-6, per FBI
b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4,-13,-15, per
FBI


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b7E-3,-4,-12, per FBI



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per FBI

~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b1-1, per FBI
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b7C-6, per FBI
b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4,-13,-15, per FBI

IV. ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page. According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²²

²² ~~(S)~~ As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI. [REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

~~(TS//NF)~~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

~~(S//NF)~~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . ."

b7E-3,-4, per FBI

~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.²³


~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."

[REDACTED]

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b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI


~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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b7E-3,-4, per FBI

V. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]



~~(S//NF)~~

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b7E-3,-4,-15, per FBI

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-1, per FBI
b7D-1, per FBI
b7E-3,-4, per FBI

b3-1, per FBI
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[REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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FD-302 (Rev. 3-8-16)

- 1 of 3 -



~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/15/2018

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

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b7C -2, per FBI

(U)

~~(S)~~ OHR met [redacted] in 2007, sometime before a January conference they both attended. OHR remembers he was at a conference [redacted] and their interaction took place prior to that event. As the Chief of DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at the time, OHR met [redacted] London at [redacted] was an expert on Russia, specifically Russian organized crime, and was concerned the west was not taking the Russian threat seriously. Russian oligarchs are brilliant yet cold-blooded and do not act like adults as they kill people for nothing. Over the years OHR and [redacted] had a few more meetings before OHR left [redacted] and joined or founded [redacted] OHR and [redacted] would see each other once a year in London or the [redacted] had paid clients, yet provided OHR with the same short intel reports from a variety of sub-sources that were well placed. OHR introduced [redacted] to his eventual handler, SA [redacted] from the FBI's New York Field office.

b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, 5, per FBI
b7C -1, 5, per FBI
b7D -1, per FBI
b7E -3, 4, 5, per FBI

~~(S)~~ (U)

(U)

~~(S)~~ OHR believes that [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b7D -1, per FBI
b7E -3, 5, per FBI

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

Investigation on 11/22/2018 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (in Person)

Sle d [redacted] Date dictated 11/22/2018

b3 -1, per FBI
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b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

(U) [redacted] Interview of [redacted] On 11/22/2016 Page 2 of 5

(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ OHR believes Russian oligarchs will provide information to the FBI because in Russia everyone talks to the police. Following the Skraidian invasion OHR met with [redacted] OHR rec [redacted] the three talked about engaging with progressive oligarchs, and that meeting led to a meeting between the FBI, [redacted] [redacted] b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b7A -1, per FBI
b6 -1, 5, per FBI
b7C -1, 5, per FBI
b7E -5, per FBI

(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ In the 2011 timeframe, [redacted] introduced the FBI to the source that predicated the FIFA case. The source may not have been the source who initiated the case, but contributed to the start of the case. b7E -5, per FBI


(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ In late July 2016, possibly Saturday, July 30, 2016, [redacted] called OHR and asked to meet for breakfast as he/she was in Washington, D.C. and had some serious stuff to talk about. [redacted] planned to also tell SA [redacted] about the information he/she had told OHR met [redacted] for breakfast where OHR was told that Carter Page met with high level officials in Russia. Page met with Secnin and other person. The media had already documented Page's trip to Moscow that time. The FBI had Trump over a barrel [redacted] b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, 3, 5, per FBI
b7A -1, per FBI
b7C -1, 3, 5, per FBI
b7D -1, 2, per FBI
b7E -3, 4, 5, per FBI

[redacted] reported to [redacted] in addition, [redacted] was furious at Paul Manafort and was asking a case against him. [redacted] almost ready to talk to the U.S. about the money Paul Manafort stole. [redacted] claimed he had already given some of this reporting to SA [redacted] and planned to give the rest to him. At that time, [redacted] had provided [redacted] with two reports regarding these topics while Glen Simpson was back. OHR provided copies of notes he took during and after the meeting with [redacted] which are enclosed as attachments. (U)

(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ OHR knew Glen Simpson hired [redacted] to dig up Trump's connections to Russia. OHR's wife is a Russian translator and was hired to conduct open source research. Even though she did not know the goal of the project, she was able to surmise the purpose as the individuals she was researching were close to Trump. OHR knew that Glen Simpson was hired by a lawyer who does opposition research. OHR knew [redacted] reporting on Trump's ties to Russia were going to the Clinton campaign, Jon winner at the U.S. State Department and the FBI. OHR was aware that Simpson was passing [redacted] information to many individuals or entities and at times [redacted] would attend meetings with Simpson. b7E -5, per FBI

(U) ~~(S//FOUO)~~ OHR met [redacted] in Washington, D.C. in late September, possibly close to the time when the Yahoo news article was published on September 23, 2016. During that meeting, [redacted] advised the Alfa server in the US is a link to the Trump campaign and Sergei Millian's Russian/American organization in the U.S. used the Alfa server two weeks b7E -5, per FBI

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/19/2015

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Brono ONR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, ONR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

~~(S)~~ ONR has never [redacted] or one occasion, ONR met with [redacted]

b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, per FBI
b7C -3, per FBI
b7D -2, per FBI
b7E -5, per FBI

~~(S)~~
(U)

~~(S)~~ ONR has never been present during meetings between [redacted] and Jon Wiber. ONR is only aware that [redacted] and Wiber have met as [redacted] advises ONR that the meetings occur.

b7E -5, per FBI

~~(S)~~ Glen Simpson directed [redacted] to speak to the press as that was what Simpson was paying [redacted] to do. ONR does not know if [redacted] going to Mother Jones was Simpson's idea or not.

~~(S)~~ Glen Simpson hired ONR's wife to conduct research for his firm. ONR will voluntarily provide his wife's research to the FBI. ONR provided the interviewing Agent with a report on Paul Manafort. The report titled, "Manafort Chronology", was scanned and is a digital attachment to this document.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-2089053
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/05/2015 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (in Person)

File # [redacted] Date dictated 12/19/2015

by [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U)

[Redacted]


b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~ Interview of Bruce [Redacted] on 1/20/2016 Page 2 of 7

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FD-302 (Rev. 3-8-83)

- 1 of 3 -



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/13/2016

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~ OHR had breakfast at Peet's Coffee, 11th and E St. NW, Washington, D.C. with Glenn Simpson at 10:00 A.M. on December 10, 2016. During breakfast Simpson provided OHR with an 8GB Verbatim USB micro digital media drive (thumb drive). OHR does not know what is on the thumb drive but believes it is in regards to the work [redacted] was hired to do for Simpson. The thumb drive was entered into evidence at WFO as original evidence [redacted] and a working copy CD-ROM was produced for investigative use. An evidence FD-302 was generated and serialized to this file.

b7E -5, 6, per FBI

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~ OHR took notes after the meeting with Simpson to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~ Simpson identified Michael Cohen, a lawyer in Brooklyn, NY as having many Russian clients in the Brighton Beach, NY area. Cohen is the go-between Russia and the Trump Campaign and replaced Paul Manafort and Carter Page. Cohen's wife's last name is Shusterman [redacted]

b6 -3, per FBI
b7C -3, per FBI

[redacted] Cohen may have attended a meeting in Prague, possibly in September, regarding the Trump Campaign and the Russians.

~~Reason: 1.4 (U)
Derived from: FBI
NSISG-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/12/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]

Date dictated 12/14/2016

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

by [redacted]

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U)

[Redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Interview of ~~XXXXXX~~ On 12/11/2016 Page 4 of 5

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ According to Simpson, much of his collection about the Trump campaign ties to Russia comes from [Redacted]
[Redacted] Simpson does not know his name.

b6 -5, per FBI
b7C -5, per FBI

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ A former Trump campaign official, possibly Rick Wilson, was talking about some of the Trump ties to Russia and the Trump campaign claim to sue him for violating his non-disclosure agreement.

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ A Russian senator and mobster named Torshin may be involved in running the Central Bank of Russia. Torshin's name comes up in a law enforcement organized crime circles as he is well known in a famous Spanish case that shows direct linkages between Russian Organized Crime, Torshin and the Russian Government. Torshin may have funneled Russian money to the National Rifle Association (NRA) to use in support of Trump. An NRA lawyer, [Redacted] found out about the money pipeline and was very upset, but the election was over by the time she learned of it. Simpson stated there are pictures of Torshin with Trump. Simpson provided GSE with an article on the NRA and Torshin. The article is an attachment to this document.

b6 -3, per FBI
b7C -3, per FBI

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Some of Simpson's staff believe the NRA spent an abnormal, large amount of money during the election, possibly indicating Russian involvement, but others in his company disagree.

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't open.

[Redacted]

b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, 5, per FBI
b7A -1, per FBI
b7C -3, 5, per FBI
b7E -1, 5, per FBI

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Simpson received a message via on December 9 that the [Redacted]
[Redacted] Simpson is not sure whether to believe this.

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Simpson still thinks Sergei Milliar is a key figure connecting Trump to Russia. Working at [Redacted] led Simpson's company to [Redacted]. Simpson would be surprised if [Redacted] was still in the U.S. Simpson believes Milliar is an SVN officer, however he is deduced this from [Redacted] Milliar's alias, not because he was told Milliar was SVN. Milliar has been [Redacted] many financial transactions from hotels to assist the Trump campaign.

(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Simpson asked [Redacted] to speak to the Warner Jones reporter as it was Simpson's Bill Haly attempt.

b7E -5, per FBI

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(U)

[Redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

Continuation of FD-302 of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Interview of XXXXXX on 12/11/04 Page 1 of 1


(U)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ OGB asked Simpson if he was concerned about his personal safety. Simpson responded that he learned from the Baltimore investigative reporting team they were capable of but there was no way for him to know if they were coming after him. Simpson mentioned that someone called and asked him to find out where all of the Nike Sars stations were located. Simpson did not state this was a threat from the Russians, but that was the impression made upon OGB based upon the timing of the message and that that story as a response to OGB's question.

~~SECRET / FOREIGN DISSEM~~

FD-302 (Rev. 3-8-59)

- 1 of 1 -



~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/27/2016

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

- (U) ~~DECLASSIFY~~: On December 29, 2016, at 11:00 A.M. OHR provided writer with an 8GB SanDisk Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive). Glen Simpson at Fusion GPS hired OHR's wife, Nellie OHR, to conduct research for his firm. OHR voluntarily provided his wife's research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with the thumb drive and indicated it contained the totality of the work Nellie OHR conducted for Simpson, but the Fusion GPS header was stripped. Nellie OHR is a Russian linguist/analyst and a former Russian History professor. The thumb drive was entered into evidence.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20411231~~

~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

Investigation on 12/20/2016 at Washington, District of Columbia, United States (in Person)

File # [redacted]


Date dictated 12/20/2016

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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FD-104 (Rev. 11-10)

- 1 of 2 -



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/31/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

(U) ~~(S//ORCON)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

(U) ~~(S//ORCON)~~ On January 20, 2017, OHR received an e-mail from Glen Simpson asking OHR to contact Simpson. OHR subsequently contacted Simpson telephonically. During the telephonic conversation, Simpson told OHR that one of [redacted] has been identified and will likely be publicly named by the media within the next couple of days.

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, 4, per FBI
b7C -3, 4, per FBI
b7D -1, 2, per FBI

[redacted]

[redacted] when OHR asked for more information regarding [redacted] and the nature of the threat, Simpson replied he would contact Steele for more information and then re-contact OHR.

(U) ~~(S//ORCON)~~ In the early hours of January 21, 2017, OHR received a text message from Steele which OHR did not notice until later in the morning. Around 9:00 am on the same day, OHR received call from Steele. During this conversation Steele relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 01/23/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]

Date dictated 01/25/2017


b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

by [redacted]

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FD-302 (Rev. 1-8-10)

1 of 1



~~SECRET//FOUO//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/27/2017

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(U)

~~(S//FOUO)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 335 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

(U)

~~(S//FOUO)~~ On January 24, 2017, OHR received a [redacted] notification from Christopher Steele. On January 25, 2017, Steele contacted and spoke with OHR via WhatsApp. During this conversation, Steele again relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his employee. Due to the possibility of the employee's identity being exposed by the media, [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, 4, per FBI
b7C -3, 4, per FBI
b7D -1, 2, per FBI
b7E -3, 4, per FBI

[Large redacted block]

(U)

~~(S//FOUO)~~ OHR took notes during the contact with Steele to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

Reason: 1.4(a)
Derived From: FBI
NSICG-20090615
Declassify On: 20421231

~~SECRET//FOUO//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 01/25/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File #

[redacted]


Date dictated 01/25/2017

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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FD-101 (Rev. 5-8-10)

- 1 -



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date Rec'd: 01/27/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 430 Pennsylvania Ave, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information.

b6 -2, per FBI
b7c -2, per FBI

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ On January 27, 2017, OHR received a ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ WhatsApp notification from Christopher Steele indicating Steele's employees [redacted] and Steele would like to keep the line of communication open with OHR for future contact. OHR replied in the affirmative.

~~Reason: 1.4 (k)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-70898619
Declassify On: 20421231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Investigation on: 01/27/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (in Person)

by: [redacted]


Date dictated: 01/27/2017

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7c -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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FD-302 (Rev. 11-18-10)

1 of 2



CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2042
DATE: 02-07-2022

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI

Date of entry 02/08/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ Bruce GHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, GHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ GHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, [redacted] via WhatsApp on January 31, 2017. On January 30, 2017, the Trump Administration fired Acting Attorney General Sally Q. Yates and Steele had contacted GHR to determine if GHR anticipated being fired as well and, if so, who in the Department of Justice could he continue to reach out to. GHR added that he had previously explained to Steele at some point, his contact with the U.S. Government would have to involve the FBI. Interviewing agents asked GHR to ask Steele if he would be comfortable getting the name of an FBI agent.

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ GHR advised Kathleen Kavalec, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State would be meeting [redacted] representatives in order to discuss potential Russian influence in their upcoming Presidential elections. GHR reminded the interviewing agents Kavalec did speak with Steele several times prior to the 2016 US Presidential election and believed Steele's reporting to have generated from mainly [redacted]

b6 -4, per FBI
b7C -4, per FBI
b7D -2, per FBI

(U) ~~SECRET//ORCON~~ GHR also advised [redacted] an attorney representing [redacted] explained his client felt [redacted] were recently complicated by the FBI, who he

b1 -1, per FBI
b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, 5, per FBI
b7A -1, per FBI
b7C -3, 5, per FBI

(U) Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived from: FBI
NSISC-70058615
Declassify On: 20421231

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 02/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [redacted]

Date dictated 02/08/2017

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

by [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

[Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview of Bruce Orr G6

Continuation of FD-302 of February 2017

[Redacted] informed OSR that [Redacted] like to 'clean things up' and felt the circumstances surrounding the US Presidential election had become 'too emotional.' OSR stated, as understood it, [Redacted] was informed of what was required during the interview.

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -3, 4, 5, per FBI
b7A -1, per FBI
b7C -3, 4, 5, per FBI
b7D -1, per FBI
b7E -3, 4, per FBI

(U)


~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FD-302 (Rev. 3-8-16)

- 1 of 2 -



~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of this report 02/15/2017

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, [redacted] via WhatsApp and OHR responded via FaceTime on 02/11/2017.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Steele advised OHR that [redacted] b6 -3, 4, per FBI
[redacted] b7C -3, 4, per FBI
[redacted] OHR added [redacted] b7D -2, per FBI

(U) ~~(S)~~ Steele's company is continuing to work for both [redacted] another attorney for [redacted] However, OHR explained Steele is beginning to worry about [redacted] b6 -3, 4, 5, per FBI
[redacted] business and was preparing a [redacted] to broker a busi- b7A -1, per FBI
relationship with the FBI. Steele advised OHR, 'You may see me re- b7C -3, 4, 5, per FBI
in a couple of weeks.' b7E -3, 4, per FBI

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR responded he had yet to ask Steele if he would like to be provided with an FBI contact.

(U) ~~(S)~~ OHR also advised [redacted] was doing fine, but were still a bit "freaked out." However, it seemed to Steele that things were calming down and he was pleased about a recent CNN article that stated U.S.

Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: FBI
NSISC-20190615
Declassify On: 20421231
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]


Investigation on 02/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (IA Person)
File # [redacted] Date dictated 02/15/2017
by [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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FD-302 (Rev 3-8-10)

- 1 of 2 -



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/04/2017

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Bruce OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDEF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -2, per FBI
b7C -2, per FBI

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ OHR stated he had recently been contacted by Christopher Steele on three separate occasions via WhatsApp or Facetime. On 12 March 2017, Steele told OHR he was concerned about receiving a letter from Senator Grassley asking Steele to disclose additional details regarding the dossier Steele compiled on Donald J. Trump. Steele also expressed concern about [redacted]

b6 -4, per FBI
b7C -4, per FBI
b7D -2, per FBI

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 15 March 2017, Steele told OHR if asked, Steele would tell the investigating congressional committees what he could about the dossier, but Steele must protect the sources and methods used to collect the information.

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 26 March 2017, Steele told OHR he expected a letter from the congressional committee investigation at any moment. Steele was aware that Glen Simpson has already received such a letter. Steele further told OHR that [redacted] an attorney representing [redacted] was acting in an informal capacity with Senator Mark Warner's staff, and was in contact with Steele. Steele noted since he resided in

b6 -3, 5, per FBI
b7C -3, 5, per FBI

Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived from: FBI NSISC-
20090919
Declassify on: 20421231

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 03/27 at Washington, District of Columbia, United States (In Person)

FBI # [redacted]

Date dictated 04/03/2017

by [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U)

[Redacted]

b1 -1, per FBI

b3 -1, per FBI

b6 -3, per FBI

b7C -3, per FBI

b7D -2, per FBI

b7E -2, per FBI

(U)

~~SECRET~~ Interview of Bruce Ehr 2:
Continuation of FD-302 of March 16, 1967
at the U.S. Court Building

01281

72017

Page 2 of 2

[Redacted]


by [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Written questions from investigators [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/30/2017

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ On 5/28/2017, SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] interviewed BRUCE OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -1, 2, per FBI
b7C -1, 2, per FBI

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ OHR and STEELE communicated via text message in WhatsApp and arranged a call for 5/3/2017 at 8:00 AM. STEELE told OHR that business was good.

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ STEELE had been worried about Director Comey's upcoming testimony to congress, especially his response to questions that would be raised by Representative Grassley. STEELE was specifically concerned about anything Director Comey would say [redacted]. STEELE was happy with Director Comey's response.

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -4, per FBI
b7C -4, per FBI
b7D -2, per FBI

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ In a previous conversation, STEELE had expressed concern for the well-being of a source. STEELE described the current disposition of this source as "stable".

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ STEELE informed OHR that the disclosure laws in the UK were more narrow than in the United States and therefore limited his ability to testify before Congress. STEELE cited specifically that he was restricted from [redacted].

b6 -3, 4, per FBI
b7C -3, 4, per FBI
b7D -2, per FBI

(U) ~~S//OC/NF~~ [redacted] and had been on the staff of the [redacted] At the time of the interview, [redacted] was working with the [redacted].

Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From National Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20271231

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 05/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (ID Person)

File # [redacted] Date dictated 05/08/2017
by [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

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~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

(U)

[Redacted]

~~Interview of [Redacted] on 8 May~~

98765

12017

Page 2 of 2

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

(U)

~~Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted]~~

~~[Redacted]~~ GLENN OLMPSON of FOSIGN-GPS and [Redacted] would be visiting STEEL
soon and were in the process of "laying up" (SET).

b6 -3, per FBI
b7C -3, per FBI

(U)

~~[Redacted]~~ DONATIAN WINER was bringing over a letter separately (SET).


(U)

~~[Redacted]~~ STEELE was interested in working with the FBI and had
additional information if the FBI was interested.

~~SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN~~

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

- 1 of 1 -



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/12/2017

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 5/12/2017, SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] interviewed BROCE OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 6th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

b6 -1, 2, per FBI
b7C -1, 2, per FBI

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp some time around Tuesday and they set up a call via WhatsApp for Wednesday 2:00 PM EST.

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Over the course of their telephone call, STEELE informed OHR that he had received a letter from the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC). The letter requested answers to the following questions:

1. Had STEELE provided information to the US Government?
2. What was the scope of STEELE's investigation?
3. Did STEELE have any additional information to provide?

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ STEELE mentioned that SIC was considering sending staffers to the UK.

(U)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ SSA [redacted] requested that OHR ask STEELE if he would be willing to have a conversation with FBI agents in the UK. OHR agreed to pass along the message.

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI

~~Reason 1.4 (b)
Derived From: National
Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20271231~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Investigation on 05/12/2017 at Person Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (IN)

File # [redacted] Date dictated 05/12/2017
by [redacted]

b3 -1, per FBI
b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI


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OIP 0046

FBI (19-cv-507)-60

FD-302 (Rev. 3-3-16)

- 1 of 1 -



~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/16/2017

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ On 5/15/2017, SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] interviewed BRUCE OHR, [redacted] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ CHRISTOPHER STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp on or around Friday, 5/12/2017. The two set up a call via WhatsApp for Saturday at 9:00 AM EST.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Per FBI's previous request, OHR asked STEELE if he would be willing to meet with FBI agents. STEELE responded that the answer was an immediate yes but that he would need to check with [redacted] OHR was clear that this would be nothing more than a conversation with the FBI and STEELE said that would be alright.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ STEELE informed OHR that he had information regarding a conversation between [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ STEELE contacted OHR via WhatsApp at 9:45 AM on Monday, 5/15/2017. STEELE said that [redacted] were both ok with him talking to the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ SSA [redacted] told OHR that he would communicate with headquarters regarding FBI agents meeting with STEELE and let him know when he received a response.

~~Reason: 1.4(b)
Derived From: National Security Information SCG
Declassify On: 20271231~~

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~


Investigation on 05/15/2017 at Person Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
File # [redacted] Date dictated 05/15/2017
by [redacted]

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OIP 0047

FD-1037 (Rev. 3-8-10)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

(U)

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE

Date: 07/31/2016

CC: JONATHAN C. MOFFA

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI

[redacted]

STRICK PETER P II

From: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

b7E -1, 7, per FBI

[redacted]

Context: STRICK PETER P II, [redacted]

Approved By: STRICK PETER P II

Drafted By: STRICK PETER P II

(U)

Case ID #:

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

~~DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS~~

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ opens and assigns investigation

~~Reason: 1.4(D)
Derived From: FBI
NSISG-20090615
Declassify On: 28411231~~

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details: (U)

~~(S//NF)~~ An investigation is being opened based on information received from Legat [redacted] on 07/29/2016. The text of that email follows:

b7E -7, per FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)

~~SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

Title: ~~(S//NF)~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE
Re: [redacted] 07/31/2016

BEGIN EMAIL:

(U//FOUO) Legat [redacted] information from [redacted]
[redacted]

b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

Synopsis:

(U//FOUO) Legat [redacted] received information from the [redacted]
[redacted] related to the hacking of the Democratic
National Committee's website/server.

b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

Details:

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] On Wednesday, July 27, 2016, Legat Attaché (Legat)
[redacted] was summoned to the office of the [redacted]
[redacted] who
will be leaving [redacted] post Saturday, July 30, 2016 and set to soon
thereafter retire from government service, advised [redacted] was called by
[redacted]
[redacted] about an urgent matter requiring an in person
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador. (Note: [redacted]
[redacted] The [redacted]
[redacted] was scheduled to be away from post until mid-August,
therefore [redacted] attended the meeting.

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] advised that [redacted] government
had been seeking prominent members of the Donald Trump campaign in
which to engage to prepare for potential post-election relations should
Trump be elected U.S. President. One of the people identified was
George Papadopoulos (although public media sources provide a spelling
of Papadopsulos), who was believed to be one of Donald Trump's foreign
policy advisers. Mr. Papadopoulos was located in [redacted] so the
[redacted] met with him on several occasions,
with [redacted] attending at least one of the meetings
[redacted] recalled [redacted]
of the meetings between Mr. Papadopoulos and the [redacted]
concerning statements Mr. Papadopoulos made about suggestions from the
Russians that they (the Russians) could assist the Trump campaign with
the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be

b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

~~SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

(U)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

Title: ~~NSA/CSS/INT~~ CROSSFIRE HURRICANE
Re: [redacted] 07/31/2016

damaging to Hillary Clinton. [redacted] provided a copy of the reporting that was provided to [redacted] from [redacted] to Legat [redacted]. The text is exactly as follows:

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7D -3, per FBI

(U) [redacted] (Begin Text)

[redacted] 5. Mr Papadopoulos [redacted]
[redacted]

b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

[redacted] He also suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs Clinton (and President Obama). It was unclear whether he or the Russians were referring to material acquired publicly or through other means. It was also unclear how Mr Trump's team reacted to the offer. He notes the Trump team's reaction could, in the end, have little bearing of what Russia decides to do, with or without Mr Trump's cooperation.

(U) [redacted] (End Text)

[redacted]
[redacted]

b7D -3, per FBI

[redacted] Legat requests that further action on this information should consider the sensitivity that this information was provided through informal diplomatic channels from the [redacted] to the U.S.

b6 -1, per FBI
b7C -1, per FBI
b7D -3, per FBI
b7E -7, per FBI

[redacted] It was clear from the conversation Legat [redacted] had with [redacted] that [redacted] knew follow-up by the U.S. government would be necessary, but extraordinary efforts should be made to protect the source of this information until such a time that a request from our organization can be made to [redacted] to obtain this information through formal channels.

END EMAIL

(U) ~~NSA/CSS/INT~~ Based on the information provided by Legat [redacted] this investigation is being opened to determine whether individual(s)

b7E -7, per FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U)

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

Title: ~~SECRET~~ PROSPECTIVE HURRICANE
Re: [REDACTED] 07/31/2016

b3 -1, per FBI
b7E -2, per FBI

associated with the Trump campaign are witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of Russia.

◆◆

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~